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Abstract
This paper aims at analyzing the impact of Employment Protection Legislation
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11 Introduction
This paper aims at analyzing the impact of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL)
on rms' investment decisions in the contemporaneous presence of nancial imperfec-
tions. Traditionally, the impact on investment of nancial market imperfections has
been analyzed separately from that of labour market imperfections. Consequently, pol-
icy design focused on each single market and did not fully take into consideration the
functioning of the other market. Analyzing how investment reacts to conditions pre-
vailing in both the nancial and labour markets may provide a better description of
rms' xed capital accumulation strategies and a more realistic set-up within which
more ecient economic policies may be designed and implemented.
There are not many papers that investigate the joint in
uence of imperfect nancial
and labour markets on investment. The impact of credit and labour market imperfec-
tions on investment has been theoretically analyzed in Rendon (2004), where it was
shown that job creation is limited by nancing constraints even in the presence of a

exible labour market, and in Wasmer and Weil (2002). The latter, by proposing a
macroeconomic model and treating credit and labour market imperfection symmetri-
cally, nd that credit market conditions may impact labour market equilibrium. Belke
and Fehn (2000) present a macro model in which capital market imperfections exacer-
bate structural unemployment caused by labour market rigidities. On the empirical side,
Calcagnini and Saltari (2003) analyze a reduced form investment model with nancing
constraints and labour market rigidities.
Of the two strands of the economic literature that study how imperfections aect
investment, the one related to nancial markets is likely the best known, debated and
empirically tested. Brie
y stated, in the presence of imperfect nancial markets the
Modigliani and Miller propositions (Modigliani and Miller, 1958, 1963) fail to hold.
Asymmetric information and agency problems make the cost of internal nance lower
than that of external nance. Thus, as a hierarchy of nancing structures arises, rms are
2more likely to be nancially constrained, and investment decisions become sensitive to
the availability of internal funds (Fazzari Hubbard and Petersen, 1988; Whited, 1992).1
As for the in
uence of labour market imperfections on investment, theoretical and
empirical contributions are scantier.2 They may be divided into two separate strands:
a more traditional one that emphasizes the impact of labour market regulations on
rms' costs and prots, and consequently on investment (Nickell and Layard, 1999;
Nickell, 2003; Blanchard, 1997 and 2000; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000); and a second
one according to which, in the presence of labour market institutions, rms are more
limited in the kind of policies they can undertake to face shocks (Denny and Nickell,
1992).3 However, more "institutional rigidities" do not necessarily result in a negative
impact on investment. Indeed, on one hand, labour market institutions are expected
to reduce current investment by increasing rm adjustment costs over time but, on
the other, they may positively in
uence investment decisions through rms' optimal
labour demand (Bentolila and Bertola, 1990; Bertola, 1999). If "institutional rigidities"
make capital readily accessible by increasing the cost of labour relative to the user
cost of capital, they will favour the substitution of labour with capital (Caballero and
Hammour, 1998). Which of the two eects on investment dominates will depend upon
the parameter values of the model utilized to describe rm decisions.
Labour market institutions are dicult to measure and, therefore, there is no a gen-
eral consensus among scholars on which indicator is the most appropriate one to utilize
in empirical analyses. However, it is now an internationally widespread custom to mea-
sure labour market institutions by means of the Employment Protection Legislation
(EPL) index (OECD, 1999 and 2004): higher EPL values mean more rigid labour mar-
kets. Recently, Nickell (2006) reviewed the main labour market indicators for the OECD
1For a critical survey on theoretical and empirical models of investment with nancial constraints
see Hubbard (1998), Saltari (2004).
2A review of the existing literature is found in Young (2003).
3As pointed out by Alesina et al. (2005), who analyze the impact of product market regulation on
investment, regulation can increase the cost the rm faces by expanding its productive capacity, and
limits its capacity to respond to changes in fundamentals.
3countries (EPL, Union Density and Coverage, Bargaining Coordination and Centraliza-
tion, among others). Alternatively, information can also be found on the Fondazione
Rodolfo DEBENEDETTI web site, that provides detailed data on labour market laws
for some European countries, but does not include a concise index.
This paper improves on existing empirical literature in two ways. First, we specify a
simple neoclassical model that incorporates nancial constraints and an adjustment cost
function that depends on the investment rate and the level of labour market regulation.
We assume that investment adjustment costs are a convex function of the investment
rate and of Employment Protection Legislation. EPL increases the cost that rms bear
when expanding or reducing their productive capacity due to the presence of hiring and
ring costs and, therefore, limits their ability to respond to changes in fundamentals.
Second, we estimate, by means of GMM system techniques, an empirical investment
equation that summarizes the relationships among variables in our theoretical model
by making use of a large dataset of individual manufacturing companies located in ten
European countries.
As in Denny and Nickell (1992), who analyze whether unions in
uence investment
directly, the idea here is that EPL not only in
uences investment via wages, and com-
plementarities and substitutabilities with the labour factor, but it also does so more
directly. Indeed, "the installation of new machinery often requires changes in work
practices if the new capital is to be operative at peak eciency. The presence of [EPL]
may inhibit these changes, thereby adding the eective cost of installation." (Denny and
Nickell, 1992, p. 874). Eventually, the authors nd that the impact of current and
expected future union power is negative.
By solving our model we were able to write down a decision making rule for invest-
ment as a function of the marginal q and of nancial and labour market variables. This
rule clearly shows that both nancial and labour market imperfections hinder investment
and that, as might be expected, the contemporaneous presence of both imperfections
makes investing more dicult.
4Our approach has attractive properties.
First, it provides us with an equation suitable for empirical analysis, after that
simplifying assumptions are made.
Second, it clearly signs the impact of EPL on investment.
Third, the results we reached at the rm level can be extended to the macroeconomic
level since investment q models with quadratic adjustment costs and a representative
agent predict smooth investment both at the microeconomic and at the macroeconomic
level.
Our empirical ndings show that investment is positively correlated to measures of
rm availability of internal funds and negatively to the level of national labour market
regulation. Moreover, the latter is stronger wherever nancial market imperfections are
larger. Indeed, when a negative shock occurs, rms may face the following trade-o:
keep losing money on unproductive workers, or re them and pay the dismissal costs
(Rendon, 2004; Saint-Paul, 2002). Indierently from the type of shocks (temporary or
permanent), rms will need to generate either additional internal funds or cut (or delay)
their investment plans if they are unable to access external funds or nd the cost of this
decision excessive. In other words, rms with better access to nancial markets are in a
position to determine their optimal investment policy, even in the presence of stringent
Employment Protection Laws, than those facing nancial constraints.
Second, we nd that small enterprises are less aected by the degree of labour market
regulation than larger ones. Indeed, EPL mostly applies to companies that exceed a
legally determined number of employees. In Italy, for instance, such a threshold has
been set at 15 employees and its existence has been analyzed as one of the causes for
the wide presence of small businesses within the Italian economy. Both Garibaldi et al.
(2003) and Schivardi and Torrini (2004) nd that these threshold eects are signicant
and robust, but quantitatively small.
Notwithstanding our eort to analyze investment decisions in a more general frame-
work than the traditional one, the nature of our analysis is still one of partial equilibrium,
5where key elements, such as the insurance role of EPL (Pissarides, 2001), or the inter-
action between product and labour market regulation (Nickell, 1999; Blanchard and
Giavazzi, 2003; Amable and Gatti, 2004; Fiori et al., 2007) are left out of the model.
Keeping in mind this limitation, our results support the eort put forward by the Eu-
ropean institutions in recent years to reform both the nancial and labour markets.
Indeed, European nancial policies increased the access to nance for a larger number
of companies and reduced its cost. For instance, the introduction of a single unit of
account has standardized the expression of prices of nancial products and simplied -
nancial transactions. This standardization yielded important economies in transactions
costs because it made nancial markets more transparent (Giavazzi et al., 2000). At the
same time, the loosening of labour market institutional rigidities favoured an increase
of the investment share devoted to capacity expansion (Calcagnini et al., 2006).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical
model, while Section 3 describes our dataset and the way variables are constructed,
presents and discusses our empirical results. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 Optimal investment in the presence of nancial
and labour market imperfections





i(Dt+i   Nt+i)g (1)
where Dt are dividends paid in period t, Nt is the value of new equity issued in period t,
 = 1=(1 + r) is a constant discount factor, Et is the expectations operator conditional
on information available at time t, and it is taken over future input and output prices
and technologies.
The rm produces in a competitive environment with a constant return to scale
6technology of the form
Yt = AF(Kt;Lt) (2)
where K is capital, L is labour, and A is constant technical progress.4
The rm faces the following laws of motion for capital and labour
Kt+1 = (1   )Kt + It (3)
and
Lt+1 = (1   
)Lt + Ht (4)
where It denotes gross investment and Ht denotes hiring (if Ht > 0) or ring (if Ht < 0).5
Moreover, we assume a constant and exogenous rate of depreciation of capital, , and
a constant and exogenous rate of voluntary quitting by workers, 
. Given the time
notation, both investment and hiring at time t do not contribute to productive capital
and labour, respectively, until period t + 1. Therefore, Kt and Lt depend only on past
investment and hiring decisions.
The rm bears continuous and convex adjustment costs in terms of foregone pro-





















where the parameters a (0 < a < 1) and b (0 < b < 1) denote the importance of
investment and labour adjustment costs, respectively. The parameters 1 (1 > 1) and






where  (  1) is a markup parameter that takes the value equal 1 under perfect competition. In this
setting, the dierence between the price maker's prots and the price taker's prots is PtF(Kt;Lt),
where  =

1  is the inverse of demand elasticity for the rm's output (Hayashi, 1982). In the presence
of imperfect competition, the interaction between labour and product market regulations may generate
dierent outcomes, according to their being complement or substitute policies (Fiori et al., 2007).
5Without loss of generality, we assume that the rm in each period either hires or res.
72 (2 > 1) make the adjustment costs of investment and labour higher as long as some
level of Employment Protection is present (EPLt > 0).6
In general, 1 S 2 so that the impact of EPLt on investment adjustment costs
may be dierent from that on labour adjustment costs. For instance, if 1 < 2, it is
likely that a decrease in EPLt may, ceteris paribus, favour labour demand relatively
more than investment demand and, consequently, determine a change in the economy
capital-labour ratio.7
As for the nancial market, we assume that issuing new equity is the only source of
external nance and that the rm may be nancially constrained because of asymmetric
information and transaction costs. Specically, the rm bears a xed cost premium of
external nance as follows (Bond and S oderbon, 2006)
(Nt) = Nt (6)
where  is a parameter that re
ects the size of the cost premium for external nance.
The sources-equal-uses constraint is
Dt   Nt = t   t (7)
where the net revenue function t is given by
t = Pt[Yt   C(It;Ht;Kt;Lt;EPLt)]   P
K
t It   WtLt (8)
where Pt is the output price, P K
t is the price of capital and Wt is the salary. Under the
assumption of perfect competition, prices are given.
The rm maximizes Vt subject to the laws of motion of K and L, to the non negative
constraint on dividend and new equity issues with shadow values D
t and N
t , respectively
6We assume quadratic adjustment costs of employment that depend on gross hiring and ring.
However, turnover adjustment costs could depend on hiring and ring, but not on voluntary quitting,
and could be asymmetric; e.g.: Nilsen, Salvanes and Schiantarelli (2007) develop a q model of labor
demand, allowing for the presence of xed, linear and quadratic components of adjustment costs.
7On this topic see European Commission (2001), Graph 9, p.114: the second part of the Nineties,
when most European countries carried out reforms that made their labour markets more 
exible, is
characterized by a lower increase in the capita-labour ratio than in the US where EPL levels are the
lowest among industrialized economies.
8V (Kt;Lt) = max
It+s;Ht+s;Nt+s
ft   (Nt) + 
D
t [ + Nt   (Nt)] + 
N
t Nt
+ Et[Vt+1((1   )Kt + It;(1   
)Lt + Ht)]g: (9)
The rst order conditions (FOCs) for the maximization problem (9) are as follows.8
The rst order condition for investment is
 It(1 + 
D








where It = @t=@It, VKt+1 = @Vt+1=@Kt+1 is the shadow value of capital, and K
t =
Et(VKt+1) is the shadow value of investment. The left hand side of equation (10) is the
marginal cost associated with an additional unit of capital, whereas the right hand side
is its marginal benet in terms of the present expected marginal value of the rm. At
the optimum the marginal cost has to be equal to the marginal benet.
The evolution of the shadow value of capital along the optimal path is
VKt = (1 + 
D
t )(Kt) + EtVKt+1(1   ) (12)
where Kt = @=@Kt is the marginal increase in the net revenue due to an additional
unit of capital.
Similarly, the rst order condition for hiring (ring) is
 Ht(1 + 
D








where Ht = @t=@Ht, VLt+1 = @Vt+1=@Lt+1 is the shadow value of labour, and L
t =
Et(VLt+1) is the shadow value of hiring.
8In the presence of additively separable adjustment costs, FOCs for capital are independent of labour
decisions, and viceversa.
9The evolution of the shadow value of labour along the optimal path is
VLt = (1 + 
D
t )(Lt) + EtVLt+1(1   
): (15)
The rst order condition for new shares is
 Nt   
D




t = 0 (16)








If new shares are issued (N











= 1   : (19)
Substituting the denitions of net revenue (8) and the equation (19) in the investment
rst order condition (11) we obtain
(P
K







t (1   ): (20)
Now, if we substitute the rst derivative of the adjustment costs function (5) into
the above equation (20) and solve for It=Kt , the investment ratio turns out to be a
function of the ratio of the shadow value of an additional unit of capital to its purchase
cost, or marginal q (q = K
t =P K
t ), and it is negatively aected by the cost of external


















10Equation (21) shows that the optimal investment rate is lower than in the standard
q model both because of nancial market and labour market imperfections.9;10;11
3 Data Description and Model Estimation
3.1 Data Description
The data used in this paper come from several sources.
Annual rm-level observations over the period 1994-2000 are taken from AMADEUS,
a comprehensive, pan-European database containing nancial information on public and
private companies in 38 European countries. The data set covers all sectors, with the
exception of the nancial sector. It is produced by Bureau van Dijk (BvD), whose
local providers collect balance sheet information, sectors of operation, and number of
employees from the national Chambers of Commerce. To allow for comparability, BvD
has developed a uniform format, composed by 23 balance sheet items, 25 prot and loss
account items, and 26 standard ratios. Additional information, such as industry and ac-
tivity codes, the incorporation year of the rm in the register, and the quoted/unquoted
indicator, complete the dataset. There are several versions of AMADEUS, depending
on the number of rms included in the dataset. In this paper we focus our analysis on
10 European countries.
To generate real variables we use national price de
ators available from the Annual
Macroeconomic (AMECO) database provided by the European Commission's Direc-
torate General for Economic and Financial Aairs (DG ECFIN).
9As for nancing constraints, Bond and S oderbon (2006) show that three dierent nancial regimes
for rms may be detected: unconstrained (D > 0 and N = 0), constrained (D = 0 and N = 0),
and external nance regime (D = 0 and N > 0). Investment displays excess sensitivity to cash 
ow

uctuations if the rm is in the constrained regime or moves from the external nance regime to either
one of the other regimes because of cash 
ow shocks. As expected, marginal q is not a sucient statistic
for investment rates in the model with an increasing cost premium for external funds.
10Rendon (2004) reaches similar results by using a dynamic model of labour demand under liquidity
constraints. Indeed, by means of computer simulation, he shows that rm's investment increases when
labour market rigidities or nancial constraints are made easier.
11Symmetrically, we can obtain a similar hiring (ring) rule for the labour input.
11Table 1 shows summary statistics by Country.12 Our nal sample contains 2669
rms of which only 82 are listed.13 We have a total of more than 10,000 observations
for each variable of interest, and the observation period used in the estimates runs from
1994 to 2000. However, the panel data is unbalanced with gaps and the average stay of
the rms in the sample is 3 years.
Tables 2 and 3 show detailed investment rate statistics. The former shows the
percentile distribution by country, while the latter shows the distribution of investment
rates according to dierent threshold values. These statistics show signicant cross-
country variability in investment rates and in their range of values for the whole sample.
Specically, the sample contains 1483 episodes of negative investment, and more than
5000 episodes of positive spikes.14
Dierent measures of Employment Protection are available to scholars. Table 4
shows descriptive statistics for the EPL indicators used in this paper.
We present estimates obtained by using the latest OECD EPL index (OECD, 2004),
Version 1, that accounts for regular and temporary workers. EPL for regular workers
mainly concerns the costs for employers of ring workers with regular contracts and it
is measured according to the strictness in the regulations for regular procedural incon-
venience, notice and severance pay for no-fault individual dismissals, and diculty of
dismissals. The strictness of EPL for temporary workers mainly concerns hiring prac-
tices such as type of contracts considered acceptable or number of successive contracts
or renewals. The index is measured both for the xed-term contracts and for temporary
agency workers. The overall EPL index ranges theoretically from 0 to 6. In our sample
the EPL ranges from 0.6 to 3.7. However, the OECD index shows little time variation
(especially over the period up to 2000 that is the period for which we have available
the AMADEUS dataset) and it may present some limitations (Bertola et al., 2000; Del
12Data Appendix discusses the sample selection procedure.
13The 82 listed rms are 1 Austrian, 2 Belgian, 2 British, 10 Finnish, 25 French, 22 German, 11
Italian, 9 Spanish.
14The papers by Cooper, Haltiwanger and Power (1999), Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) dene spikes
to be cases where investment relative to the beginning of period capital is greater than 20 percent.
12Conte et al., 2004). Therefore, Section 3.4, also presents some robustness checks by using
two other indicators. Specically, we rst use the index (EPL BW) that was developed
by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) and updated by Nickell et al. (2001) and G omez-
Salvador et al. (2004). The EPL BW index is scaled from 0 to 6 as the OECD index,
and in our sample ranges from 0.50 to 3.82. EPL BW exhibits greater time variability
than EPL OECD, but, to a large extent, this variability is due to the interpolation of
previous EPL measures as calculated by Lazear (1990) and the OECD.
Second, we develop a new index (EPL fRDB) starting from information available
on the Fondazione Rodolfo DEBENEDETTI web site (fRDB). The fRDB hosts a docu-
mentation centre on social policy reforms and the EU labour markets. We constructed
our index by using information available in the Social Reforms database on social re-
forms in the EU15 countries (except Luxembourg) over the period 1987-2005. The Data
Appendix describes the methodology we followed to construct the fRDB index.
13Table 1: Summary Statistics, 1994-2000
Country I=K CF=K LIQ=K Usercost Workers Rtas  (VA=K) EPL
Austria Obs. 69 68 68 80 49 78 52 80
mean .138 .331 .588 1.029 801.122 .075 .040 2.2
median .081 .273 .383 1.040 706 .061 .030 2.2
sd .218 .236 .485 .017 391.221 0.071 .545 0
Belgium Obs. 655 654 653 816 809 809 493 816
mean .307 .729 1.548 1.100 210.143 .070 .195 2.417
median .226 .552 .890 1.110 112 .045 .124 2.2
sd .364 .618 2.445 .027 316.747 .080 1.774 .412
Finland Obs. 294 294 294 294 270 293 222 294
mean .131 .640 1.353 1.102 671.256 .129 .214 2.1
median .063 .322 .518 1.113 196.5 .110 .065 2.1
sd .235 1.698 4.505 .016 1786.439 .149 1.857 0
France Obs. 2767 2763 2747 3438 2828 3284 2102 3438
mean .323 1.305 3.364 .995 425.886 .105 .317 3
median .231 .664 1.265 .992 183 .089 .067 3
sd .412 3.505 9.993 .017 974.865 .082 24.651 0
Germany Obs. 280 280 280 350 312 347 211 350
mean .129 .312 .589 1.003 1491.071 .098 .064 2.717
median .074 .270 .412 1 856 .092 .024 2.5
sd .206 .193 .643 .019 1802.019 .075 .572 .285
Great Britain Obs. 687 687 687 858 850 853 516 858
mean .209 .449 .748 .769 697.789 .122 -.159 .613
median .163 .275 .407 .720 249.5 .101 -.081 .6
sd .230 .638 1.151 .114 1825.114 .104 .764 .030
Italy Obs. 4501 4499 4480 5593 5415 5417 3420 5593
mean .347 .997 1.772 .912 242.111 .080 .002 3.081
median .240 .392 .649 .901 121 .055 -.001 3.26
sd .440 9.166 9.830 .030 695.468 0.082 5.878 .415
The Netherlands Obs. 51 51 51 64 63 63 38 64
mean .256 1.037 3.329 1.019 1078.937 0.154 -.048 2.55
median .168 .510 1.058 1.019 265 0.138 .137 2.7
sd .349 1.033 5.019 .009 2714.256 0.099 1.198 .262
Portugal Obs. 24 24 24 32 29 32 16 32
mean .171 .257 .376 1.069 371.276 0.023 .004 3.7
median .100 .219 .233 1.074 291 0.015 -.020 3.7
sd .260 .154 .393 .027 259.432 0.038 .372 0
Spain Obs. 1576 1577 1577 1968 1606 1950 1186 1968
mean .258 .842 1.675 1.008 248.016 0.099 .148 2.962
median .191 .449 .740 1.019 136 0.075 .017 2.9
sd .341 2.385 5.512 .028 894.557 0.096 1.928 .096
Total Obs. 10904 10897 10861 13493 12231 13126 8256 13493
mean .303 .969 2.037 .957 363.120 .093 .112 2.809
median .214 .451 .759 .973 150 .072 .010 3
sd .398 6.231 8.446 .084 1011.919 .089 13.034 .678
14Table 2: Investment Rates: percentiles by Country, 1994-2000
Country p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Austria -.122 -.000 .081 .267 .498
Belgium -.033 .074 .226 .467 .710
Finland -.080 -.017 .063 .209 .422
France -.002 .095 .231 .423 .709
Germany -.068 -.015 .074 .236 .406
Great Britain .000 .062 .163 .302 .476
Italy -.014 .085 .240 .457 .793
The Netherlands -.033 .021 .168 .388 .632
Portugal -.086 -.016 .100 .247 .496
Spain -.041 .041 .191 .372 .619
Total -.023 .069 .214 .412 .704
Table 3: Distribution of Investment Rates, 1994-2000
I/K Observations Percentiles
I=K < 0 1483 13.6
I=K = 0 5 0.0
0 < I=K < 0:02 331 3.0
0:02  I=K < 0:08 1125 10.3
0:08  I=K < 0:12 792 7.3
0:12  I=K < 0:2 1476 13.6
0:2  I=K < 0:3 1653 15.1
I=K > 0:3 4039 37.0
Total 10904 100
Table 4: EPL Indicators. Summary Statistics, 1994-2000
EPL OECD EPL BW EPL fRDB
mean 2.81 2.96 0.82
max 3.70 3.82 1.11
min 0.60 0.50 0.10
sd 0.68 0.74 0.22
153.2 Model Estimation
To make equation (21) suitable to estimation, taking into account information contained
in our dataset, some changes concerning the variables and the equation specication were
needed.
First, as explained in the Section 3.1, most of the rms for which we have balance-
sheet data are not listed. Therefore, for these rms, we were unable to construct any
measure of individual marginal or average q, as would be the case for listed companies.
We decided to substitute the marginal q with a protability variable, namely the return
on total assets (RTASi;t).
For the purpose of checking result robustness, we also estimated equation (21) by
substituting the protability variable with an accelerator-type variable, i.e. the change
between two consecutive years of the value added - total xed assets ratio ((V A=K)i;t)
in place of RTASi;t.
Second, nancial market imperfections are embedded in equation (21) by means of
the  term. The larger nancial market imperfections are, the higher  is, the lower q
and investment are. Here, to explicitly take into account nancial market imperfections,
we followed the nowadays traditional approach of adding a liquidity variable in the in-
vestment equation. Indeed, in the presence of nancial constraints, investment becomes
sensitive to the availability of internal sources of nance. The liquidity variable we used
is total cash-in-hand available to the rm, (LIQ=K)i;t, instead of the cash-
ow vari-
able.15 Our choice concerning the liquidity variable is also supported by the fact that
(LIQ=K)i;t is strongly and positively associated (the correlation coecient is r = 0:72)
with an index of nancing obstacles obtained from the World Business Environment
15Among others, Calcagnini and Saltari (2003) argue that cash 
ow might not eciently measure the
extent to which investment depends on internally generated funds. A main concern, in addition to the
Kaplan and Zingales critique (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988, 2000; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997,
2000; Cleary, Povel, and Raith, 2004), is the fact that cash 
ow depends on balance sheet policies, and
therefore is more an accounting variable than an economic variable. Moreover, investment may also
depend on the availability of other, less volatile, nancial resources. See also Bond et al. (2004) for a
discussion about measurement errors and the explanatory power of cash 
ow.
16Survey (WBES), a cross-national survey conducted in developed and developing coun-
tries in 1999 by the World Bank and published in Beck et al. (2002), Table I, p.39. This
correlation is only 0.37 between the WBES index and the cash-
ow.
Third, the interaction between nancial and labour market imperfections, repre-
sented by the last term of equation (21), is included in our empirical equation by the
(LIQ=K)i;t  EPLj;t variable.
Fourth, we added the previous period investment rate (I=K)i;t 1, to equation (21) to
take into account the likely presence of the autoregressive process in observed investment.
Fifth, the price ratio P K
j;t=Pj;t, or user cost of capital, is calculated at the country
level. Therefore, we assume that changes in the user cost of capital among rms can
be controlled for by additive year-specic eects, dt, and rm-specic eects, i. Firm-
specic eects are also justied by the variability of capital depreciation rates across
rms (Bond and Meghir, 1994).
Sixth, the model includes country dummies, 'j that control for the heterogeneous
environment in which rms operate. In the absence of country dummies, the EPL index
may capture other aspects, dierent from the tightness of Employment Protection.
Finally, given the impossibility to estimate the original structural equation as a
function of q, we opted for a version of equation (21) where investment is linearly
dependent on explanatory variables.16
Therefore, our empirical specication of equation (21) is
(I=K)i;t = 0 + 1(I=K)i;t 1 + 2RTASi;t + 3P
K
j;t=Pj;t + 4EPLj;t
+ 5(LIQ=K)i;t + 6(LIQ=K)i;t  EPLj;t + dt + i + 'j + vit (22)
where the subscript i refers to the single company, t to the time period, and j to the
country.
16At rst we thought of taking logs of equation (21), but because of the negative values in the
investment rate series, as is also the case for the other two variables RTAS and (V A=K), we decided
to work with the original variables.
17As for the sign of the coecients in equation (22), we expect a positive sign for 1,
2, 5, and a negative sign for 3, 4, 6.
To estimate our model we dealt with an unbalanced panel data of rms, and, given
the dynamic structure of equation (22), we used the system GMM estimator approach as
in Blundell, Bond, and Windmeijer (2000), and Blundell and Bond (1998). This method
controls for the presence of the unobserved rm-specic eect and for the endogeneity of
contemporaneous regressors. It uses equations in rst-dierences for which endogenous
variables lagged two or more periods will be valid instruments, provided there is no serial
correlation in the time varying component of the error term. This assumption is tested
by performing tests for serial correlation in the rst dierences residuals. The equations
in dierences are combined with the equations in levels, for which lagged dierences of
the variables are used as instruments. AR(1) and AR(2) are the empirical realizations of
the test statistics of rst and second order residual autocorrelation. Signicance means
that the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation is rejected. The absence of AR(2) is the
necessary condition for unbiased and ecient estimates.
We use the one-step variant of the system GMM and we require that the robust
estimator of the covariance matrix of the parameter estimates be calculated. Therefore,
the resulting standard error estimates are consistent in the presence of any pattern of
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within the panel. Instruments' validity is tested
by using the Hansen J test for overidentied restrictions, that, dierently from the
Sargan test, is robust to autocorrelation or heteroskedasticity.17
3.3 Discussion of Results
Estimation results for the investment equation (22) are shown in Table 5. The latter
shows six dierent specications of equation (22) that we will discuss in turn.
Column (1) shows the base model. All estimated coecients, with the exception
17Indeed, Arellano and Bond (1991) nd the one-step Sargan test over-rejects in the presence of
heteroskedasticity. Moreover, we test the exogeneity of each instrument subset by dierence-in-Sargan
tests and we do not reject the null of exogeneity.
18of the user cost of capital coecient, 3, are statistically signicant at conventional
probability levels. As expected, investment shows a persistent autoregressive dynamic
(1 = 0:568). Moreover, the return on the total assets coecient is positive and statis-
tically signicant, as well as the estimated liquidity index coecient. The latter result
supports the hypothesis that, on average, rms in our dataset show excess sensitivity
to the availability of internal liquidity sources or, equivalently, that nancial market
imperfections do likely exist.18
The estimated coecient of current EPL is negative and statistically signicant, as
well as the coecient of the interaction variable between EPL and the liquidity index.
Together, these two results show that labour market imperfections are detrimental for
investment and that their eects are larger in the contemporaneous presence of nancial
market imperfections.19
The empirical model in column (2) of Table 5 takes into account the fact that EPL
usually applies dierently to rms according to their size. Indeed, EPL is often stricter
when applied to rms with a number of employees larger than a legally determined
threshold (OECD, 2004).20
Therefore, by means of information obtained from Bertola, Boeri and Cazes (1999)
and from Bonin (2005), we dened a new dummy variable, SIZEi;t that takes value
equal to 1 when the rm is exempted from EPL according to the number of employees.
Overall, our sample contains 61 rms exempted from EPL of which 43 are Spanish, 3
are French, and 15 are Italian.
Therefore, our base equation (22) was changed by simply adding the new dummy
18Since 6 is negative, to analyze the overall impact of liquidity on investment, we run the following
F test
5 + 6  EPL = 0
where EPL is the sample mean value of EPL. The F test result rejected the null in favour of a positive
impact of (LIQ=K) on investment.
19Estimates in Table 5 do not signicantly change if we add industry or legal origin dummy variables
to equation (22). Estimates available upon request from authors.
20Boeri and Jimeno (2005) look for discontinuity in dismissals probability at the threshold dening
the range exempted from EPL. Messina and Vallanti (2007) make inferences on the impact of EPL by
exploiting the within country variation in the enforcement of EPL.
19variable SIZEi;t to it
(I=K)i;t = 0 + 1(I=K)i;t 1 + 2RTASi;t + 3P
K
j;t=Pj;t + 4EPLj;t + 5(LIQ=K)i;t
+ 6(LIQ=K)i;t  EPLj;t + 7SIZEi;t + dt + i + 'j + vit (23)
We expect 7 to be positive: ceteris paribus, small-sized rms should invest more than
larger rms because their decision is not negatively aected by EPL.
Estimates of equation (23) are shown in column (2) of Table 5 and, when compared
to the same coecients of column (1), they do not show signicant changes. Moreover,
as expected, 7 is positive and statistically signicant.
To measure the overall impact of EPL for exempted rms on investment, we run the
following test:
4 + 6  LIQ=K + 7 = 0
where LIQ=K is the mean value of our liquidity variable. Here the null is that the
impact of EPL on investment for exempt rms is zero and our results show that we fail
to reject the null (see the EPL-F test at the bottom of Table 5).
Columns (3) and (4) respectively show the estimates of equations (22) and (23), in
which the protability variable RTASi;t has been replaced by the (V A=K)i;t variable.
As may be expected, some changes occurred in the values of the estimated coecients
but, overall, results shown in columns (3) and (4) are equivalent to those in column (1)
and (2) and conrm the negative role that market imperfections play on investment.
Finally, columns (5) and (6) show results for equation (22) when the four countries
(Austria, Finland, France and Portugal) that during the period 1994-2000 experienced
no changes in the OECD EPL index are dropped from our sample.21 For the sake
of space, we only show estimates that use RTASi;t as explanatory variable instead
of (V A=K)i;t. Results, notwithstanding the partial loss of the EPL cross-country
21As for the other two EPL indexes used, Finland is the only country for which the EPL FRDB
index does not change in the period 1994-2000, while Austria and Great Britain are the two countries
for which the EPL BW does not change in the same period.
20variability due to the reduced number of countries in the sample, are equivalent to those
shown in the rst four columns.
21Table 5: Fixed Investment Models
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(I=K)i;t 1 0.568*** 0.497*** 0.677*** 0.606*** 0.628*** 0.534***
[0.094] [0.10] [0.077] [0.090] [0.086] [0.11]
RTASi;t 0.610** 0.689** 0.682** 0.479*
[0.28] [0.29] [0.28] [0.29]
(V A=K)i;t 0.002*** 0.002***
[0.000] [0.000]
PK
j;t=Pj;t -0.118 -0.124 -0.151 -0.164 0.0871 0.111
[0.24] [0.24] [0.25] [0.24] [0.24] [0.24]
EPLj;t -0.232*** -0.214*** -0.187*** -0.171*** -0.345*** -0.340***
[0.047] [0.047] [0.043] [0.043] [0.062] [0.063]
(LIQ=K)i;t 0.052*** 0.053*** 0.043*** 0.047*** 0.049*** 0.045***
[0.007] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.004] [0.005]
(LIQ=K)i;t*EPLj;t -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.014***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.001] [0.002]
SIZEi;t 0.716** 0.676* 0.503*
[0.34] [0.35] [0.30]
Constant 0.218 0.213 0.275 0.284 0.131 0.151
[0.18] [0.18] [0.18] [0.18] [0.18] [0.18]
time dummies X X X X X X
country dummies X X X X X X
Observations 7893 7893 8197 8197 5655 5655
Number of rms 2665 2665 2665 2665 1898 1898
F test (p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen J test (p value) 0.177 0.317 0.333 0.393 0.205 0.182
AR1 (p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR2 (p value) 0.979 0.932 0.293 0.347 0.457 0.414
Liquidity F test (p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
EPL F test (p value) - 0.192 - 0.191 - 0.665
NOTES: Robust standard errors are reported in brackets below coecients. *p < 0:10; **p < 0:05;
***p < 0:01 signicance levels respectively. Estimation by GMM-SYSTEM using STATA 9.2 SE
package one-step results; 'Hansen J' is test of the overidentied restrictions (p-value reported); AR(k)
is the test statistic for the presence of k-th order serial correlation in the rst-dierenced residuals,
distributed N(0,1) under the null; Liquidity and EPL are F Tests of the joint signicance of the
liquidity and EPL terms, respectively.
223.4 Robustness Checks
This Section shows additional estimates of equation (22) by using alternative EPL in-
dexes to the OECD one. Indeed, as pointed out in Section (3.1), the OECD EPL index
is often criticized for its poor time variation, especially over the time period analyzed
in this paper.
We used two alternative indexes of the strictness of Employment Protection, labelled
EPL BW and EPL fRDB, respectively. The former was rst developed by Blanchard
and Wolfers (2000) and updated by Nickell et al. (2001) and Gomez Salvador et al.
(2004). The latter is an index that we constructed starting from information available
on the Fondazione Rodolfo DEBENEDETTI web site (fRDB).
Table 6 shows the estimation results for the two equations (22) and (23) with the
two new dierent EPL indexes. Columns (1)-(2) and columns (3)-(4) show estimates
that use the EPL BW index and the EPL fRDB index, respectively.
As for the estimates that make use of the EPL BW index, they conrm the previous
results we found by using the OECD EPL index. Investment is negatively aected by
the presence of positive EPL levels: the estimated coecient of EPL BW (4) is always
negative and statistically signicant. The liquidity-ratio coecient (5) is positive and
statistically signicant, while the coecient of the interaction variable between liquidity
and EPL BW, (6), is negative and statistically signicant in the base equation, column
(1), and when we control for rm size, column (2).
Finally, when we used the fRDB index, the coecient of EPL fRDB was always
negative and statistically signicant.22 However, the estimated coecients (LIQ=K)i;t
and (LIQ=K)i;t  EPL fRDBj;t were never statistically signicant.
Overall, these results strongly support the negative relationship between investment
and EPL, while they are mixed with respect to the contemporaneous role of labour
and nancial market imperfections on investment. Instead, results produced no clear
22The size of the estimated coecients of EPL fRDB is larger than the size of the estimated coe-
cients of EPL OECD and EPL BW due to their dierent scales. See Data Appendix for details.
23indications especially in the equation specication that makes use of the Fondazione
Rodolfo DEBENEDETTI EPL variable that we constructed starting from disaggregated
information. We do not exclude the possibility that this result may heavily depend on
our decisions about the weights we assigned to the two components of labour market
reforms by means of which we constructed the index.23
23As explained in the Appendix, we rst assigned weights 1 and 2 to the marginal and structural
components of labour market reforms, respectively. Tentatively, we changed these weights to 1 and 5,
but results did not change.
24Table 6: Robustness Checks
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
(I=K)i;t 1 0.456*** 0.297* 0.564*** 0.295**
[0.13] [0.18] [0.12] [0.15]
RTASi;t 0.702* 0.866** 0.574* 0.232
[0.41] [0.43] [0.32] [0.41]
PK
j;t=Pj;t -0.0405 -0.0726 -1.163*** -1.067***
[0.23] [0.22] [0.37] [0.35]
(LIQ=K)i;t 0.036** 0.068*** 0.002 -0.002
[0.017] [0.024] [0.008] [0.010]
EPL BWj;t -0.191*** -0.146**
[0.064] [0.066]




EPL fRDBj;t -12.02*** -10.23***
[2.67] [2.68]
(LIQ=K)i;t  EPL fRDBj;t 0.003 0.008
[0.0089] [0.011]
Constant 0.124 0.111 2.279*** 2.078***
[0.17] [0.17] [0.50] [0.50]
time dummies X X X X
country dummies X X X X
Observations 7893 7893 7893 7893
Number of rms 2665 2665 2665 2665
F test (p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen J test (p value) 0.192 0.139 0.184 0.170
AR1 (p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR2 (p value) 0.958 0.778 0.964 0.654
Liquidity F test (p value) 0.000 0.000 - -
EPL F test (p value) - - - 0.001
NOTES: Robust standard errors are reported below coecients. *p < 0:10; **p < 0:05; ***p < 0:01
signicance levels respectively. Estimation by GMM-SYSTEM using STATA 9.2 SE package one-step
results; 'Hansen J' is test of the overidentied restrictions (p-value reported); AR(k) is the test
statistic for the presence of k-th order serial correlation in the rst-dierenced residuals, distributed
N(0,1) under the null; Liquidity and EPL are F Tests of the joint signicance of the liquidity, and
EPL terms, respectively.
254 Conclusions
This paper analyzed the link between investment, nancing constraints and the im-
perfections in the labour market as measured by the levels of the OECD Employment
Protection Legislation index.
We presented and discussed a neoclassical investment model with nancing con-
straints, in which EPL is inserted as a component of the investment adjustment costs
function of the rm. The idea behind this modelling of the investment adjustment cost
function is that regulation (a) increases the cost the rm faces when expanding or re-
ducing its capital stock, and (b) limits its ability to respond to changes in fundamentals.
One result of this type of investment adjustment cost function is that the rm's decision
to invest clearly depends upon the presence of nancial and labour market imperfections.
Specically, we showed that current EPL has a negative impact on current investment,
and that the joint impact of EPL and nancing constraints on investment is detrimental
for investment.
These theoretical conclusions found empirical support in the estimation of a panel
data model, by means of a large dataset containing information on companies from ten
European countries and national Employment Protection Legislation systems.
Empirically, we also showed that investment decisions of small-sized rms (i.e., de-
ned according to each national exemption threshold of EPL) are, as expected, not
aected by labour market regulations.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it suggests a simple way to incor-
porate labour market imperfections into the investment adjustment cost function that
produces clearcut results on optimal investment. Second, it reports a set of empirical
estimates that support both the theoretical model and the eort put forward by the
E.U. to liberalize markets.
We leave to future research the extension of our work to the case with an increased
number of markets that simultaneously aect rm investment decisions. Specically, we
26plan to study how the departure from perfect competition impacts investment in the
contemporaneous presence of nancial and labour market imperfections.
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Data Appendix
Sample and variable denition
Data have been treated as follows.
First of all, to avoid double counting, we have dropped from the initial sample rms
for which we only had consolidated accounts.
Second, we controlled for outliers with respect to the median on original vari-
ables: tangible xed assets (K), Depreciation (DEPR), Cash Flow (CF), Sales (TURN),
Non Current Liabilities (NCLI), Cash and Cash Equivalent (CASH), Operating Prots
32(OPPL), Value Added (VA), Liquidity Ratio (LIQR), Cost of Materials (MATE), Cost
of Employees (STAFF), Cost of Good Sold (COST).
In particular we substituted observations that were below (33 percent) or above (100
percent)the median of the rm with the interpolated value. The average percentage of
observations considered outliers by the lter is 8 percent of the initial sample.
Third, since the data set did not provide data on Tangible Fixed Assets for Austria
and Germany, we replaced Tangible Fixed Assets with Total Fixed Assets. In this way
we have not lost information on German and Austrian rms. To check whether this step
in
uenced our estimates, we ran regressions with and without these two countries, and
the estimates did not change signicantly.24
Finally, we restricted our data set to rms for which we had observations lasting at
least ve years on the above mentioned original variables. This step allowed us to identify
the reduced form parameters of the model, and to use the overidentied restrictions to
test the model's instruments.25
Our nal sample is composed of more than 10,000 observations.
Eventually, we constructed our regression variables as follows:
- It = Kt   Kt 1 + DEPRt;
- RTASt = Pofit(Loss)BeforeTaxation=TotalAssets
- LIQt = CFt 1 + CASHt
- (V A=K)i;t = (V At=Kt 1)   (V At 1=Ki;t 1)
- (PK=P)t=Investment De
ator / Output De
ator;
- oprekt = TURNt=Kt 1;
24Estimates available upon request.
25To identify the autoregressive parameter we needed at least three time series observations of in-
vestment (Bond, 2002). Given that we lose one year to construct investment, with four time period
observations we could exactly identify the model, whereas with ve time period observations we can
use the overidentied restrictions to test instrument validity.
33Variables are in real terms. Price de
ators of gross value added for the manufactur-
ing industry are available for each country from Chapter 14 of the AMECO database
provided by the European Commission DG ECFIN. Since we did not have price de
a-
tors for gross investment, we have constructed a price de
ator for each country that is
a weighted average of price de
ators for gross xed capital formation in three sectors:
Equipment, Metal Products and Machinery, and Transport Equipment. Data have been
taken from Chapter 4 of AMECO.
The Foundation RODOLFO DEBENEDETTI EPL index
The fRDB EPL index has been developed starting from information available on the
the Fondazione Rodolfo DEBENEDETTI (fRDB) web site. The fRDB provides a doc-
umentation centre on social policy reforms and EU labour markets. Particularly, we
used the Social Reforms Database that collects information about social reforms in the
EU15 Countries (except Luxembourg) over the period 1987-2005. The database has
been created by fRDB and it is constantly updated. It focuses on four areas of reforms:
Employment Protection Legislation (EPL); Public Pension Systems; Non-Employment
Benets; Migration Policies.
The fRDB Social Reforms Database collects qualitative features of reforms. In fact,
EPL reforms have been classied along two main lines
1. direction (sign): Do they make [EPL] more or less stringent? We have redened
this variable so that sign is equal to 1 if EPL becomes stricter, -1 if EPL loosens;
2. scope (dim): Are these reforms marginal or radical? In order to decide whether
a reform is marginal or radical, fRDB implements a two step procedure: rst,
a qualitative assessment on the reforms is made; second, trends in selected time
series are analyzed. The variable dim is equal to 1 if the reform is marginal; 2 if
the reform is structural.
34Finally, an index of coherence (cohe) among all the measures of the same reform has been
assigned to each reform: it is computed as the ratio between the number of measures of
"prevailing" sign over the total number of measures it involves.26
Therefore, the fRDB index has been obtained by implementing the following steps:
1. we used the OECD EPL index, Version 1, for the year 1985 (base year) and for
all countries;
2. the EPL fRDB indicator for the rst year (1985) and for each country i was dened
as





 ratioi;85 = EPL OECDi;1985=EPL OECDIT;1985  100;

P
j EPL newi;j;85 =
P
j signi;j;85  cohei;j;85  dim epli;j;85 where j's are the
reforms taken in country i in year 1985;
3. the EPL fRDB indicator for the following years was dened as




Summary statistics for the three indicators are reported in Table 4.
26For further details www.frdb.org=documentazione.
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